Union Calendar No. 281

111TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION

H.R. 5026

[Report No. 111-493]

To amend the Federal Power Act to protect the bulk-power system and electric infrastructure critical to the defense of the United States from cybersecurity and other threats and vulnerabilities.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 14, 2010

Mr. Markey of Massachusetts (for himself and Mr. Upton) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce

May 25, 2010

Reported with amendments, committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]

[For text of introduced bill, see copy of bill as introduced on April 14, 2010]

A BILL

To amend the Federal Power Act to protect the bulk-power system and electric infrastructure critical to the defense of the United States from cybersecurity and other threats and vulnerabilities.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 4 This Act may be cited as the "Grid Reliability and Infrastructure Defense Act" or the "GRID Act". SEC. 2. AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL POWER ACT. 7 (a) Critical Electric Infrastructure Secu-RITY.—Part II of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824 et seg.) is amended by adding after section 215 the following 10 new section: "SEC. 215A. CRITICAL ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE SECU-12 RITY. 13 "(a) Definitions.—For purposes of this section: 14 "(1) Bulk-power system; electric reli-15 ORGANIZATION; REGIONAL ENTITY.—The ABILITY16 terms 'bulk-power system', 'Electric Reliability Orga-17 nization', and 'regional entity' have the meanings 18 given such terms in paragraphs (1), (2), and (7) of 19 section 215(a), respectively. 20 "(2) Defense critical electric infrastruc-21 TURE.—The term 'defense critical electric infrastruc-22 ture' means any infrastructure located in the United 23 States (including the territories) used for the genera-24 tion, transmission, or distribution of electric energy 25 that—

1	"(A) is not part of the bulk-power system;						
2	and						
3	"(B) serves a facility designated by the						
4	President pursuant to subsection (d)(1), but is						
5	not owned or operated by the owner or operator						
6	of such facility.						
7	"(3) Defense critical electric infrastruc-						
8	TURE VULNERABILITY.—The term 'defense critical						
9	electric infrastructure vulnerability' means a weak-						
10	ness in defense critical electric infrastructure that, in						
11	the event of a malicious act using electronic commu-						
12	nication or an electromagnetic pulse, would pose a						
13	substantial risk of disruption of those electronic de-						
14	vices or communications networks, including hard-						
15	ware, software, and data, that are essential to the re-						
16	liability of defense critical electric infrastructure.						
17	"(4) Electromagnetic pulse.—The term 'elec-						
18	tromagnetic pulse' means 1 or more pulses of electro-						
19	magnetic energy emitted by a device capable of dis-						
20	abling, disrupting, or destroying electronic equipment						
21	by means of such a pulse.						
22	"(5) Geomagnetic storm.—The term 'geo-						
23	magnetic storm' means a temporary disturbance of						
24	the Earth's magnetic field resulting from solar activ-						

ity.

1	"(6) Grid Security threat.—The term 'grid					
2	security threat' means a substantial likelihood of—					
3	" $(A)(i)$ a malicious act using electronic					
4	communication or an electromagnetic pulse, or a					
5	geomagnetic storm event, that could disrupt th					
6	operation of those electronic devices or commu-					
7	nications networks, including hardware, soft-					
8	ware, and data, that are essential to the reli-					
9	ability of the bulk-power system or of defen					
10	critical electric infrastructure; and					
11	"(ii) disruption of the operation of such de-					
12	vices or networks, with significant adverse effec					
13	on the reliability of the bulk-power system or					
14	defense critical electric infrastructure, as a resul					
15	of such act or event; or					
16	"(B)(i) a direct physical attack on the bulk-					
17	power system or on defense critical electric infra-					
18	structure; and					
19	"(ii) significant adverse effects on the reli-					
20	ability of the bulk-power system or of defense					
21	critical electric infrastructure as a result of suc					
22	physical attack.					
23	"(7) Grid Security Vulnerability.—The term					
24	'grid security vulnerability' means a weakness that,					
25	in the event of a malicious act using electronic com-					

1	munication or an electromagnetic pulse, would pose a					
2	substantial risk of disruption to the operation of thos					
3	electronic devices or communications networks, in					
4	cluding hardware, software, and data, that are essen-					
5	tial to the reliability of the bulk-power system.					
6	"(8) Large transformer.—The term large					
7	transformer' means an electric transformer that is					
8	part of the bulk-power system.					
9	"(9) Protected information.—The term 'pro-					
10	tected information' means information, other than					
11	classified national security information, designated a					
12	protected information by the Commission under sub-					
13	section (e)(2)—					
14	"(A) that was developed or submitted in					
15	connection with the implementation of this sec-					
16	tion;					
17	"(B) that specifically discusses grid security					
18	threats, grid security vulnerabilities, defense crit-					
19	ical electric infrastructure vulnerabilities, or					
20	plans, procedures, or measures to address such					
21	threats or vulnerabilities; and					
22	"(C) the unauthorized disclosure of which					

could be used in a malicious manner to impair

the reliability of the bulk-power system or of de-

 $fense\ critical\ electric\ infrastructure.$

23

24

- 1 "(10) SECRETARY.—The term 'Secretary' means 2 the Secretary of Energy.
- 3 "(11) SECURITY.—The definition of 'security' in 4 section 3(16) shall not apply to the provisions in this 5 section.

"(b) Emergency Response Measures.—

- "(1) Authority to address grid security
 Threats.—Whenever the President issues and provides to the Commission (either directly or through
 the Secretary) a written directive or determination
 identifying an imminent grid security threat, the
 Commission may, with or without notice, hearing, or
 report, issue such orders for emergency measures as
 are necessary in its judgment to protect the reliability
 of the bulk-power system or of defense critical electric
 infrastructure against such threat. As soon as practicable but not later than 180 days after the date of
 enactment of this section, the Commission shall, after
 notice and opportunity for comment, establish rules of
 procedure that ensure that such authority can be exercised expeditiously.
- "(2) Notification of congress.—Whenever the President issues and provides to the Commission (either directly or through the Secretary) a written directive or determination under paragraph (1), the

1	President (or the Secretary, as the case may be) shall					
2	promptly notify congressional committees of relevant					
3	jurisdiction, including the Committee on Energy and					
4	Commerce of the House of Representatives and the					
5	Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the					
6	Senate, of the contents of, and justification for, such					
7	directive or determination.					
8	"(3) Consultation.—Before issuing an order					
9	for emergency measures under paragraph (1), the					
10	Commission shall, to the extent practicable in light of					
11	the nature of the grid security threat and the urgen					
12	of the need for such emergency measures, consult with					
13	appropriate governmental authorities in Canada and					
14	Mexico, entities described in paragraph (4), the Sec-					
15	retary, and other appropriate Federal agencies re-					
16	garding implementation of such emergency measures.					
17	"(4) APPLICATION.—An order for emergency					
18	measures under this subsection may apply to—					
19	"(A) the Electric Reliability Organization;					
20	"(B) a regional entity; or					
21	"(C) any owner, user, or operator of the					
22	bulk-power system or of defense critical electric					
23	infrastructure within the United States.					
24	"(5) Discontinuance.—The Commission shall					

issue an order discontinuing any emergency measures

ordered under this subsection, effective not later than days after the earliest of the following:

- "(A) The date upon which the President issues and provides to the Commission (either directly or through the Secretary) a written directive or determination that the grid security threat identified under paragraph (1) no longer exists.
- "(B) The date upon which the Commission issues a written determination that the emergency measures are no longer needed to address the grid security threat identified under paragraph (1), including by means of Commission approval of a reliability standard under section 215 that the Commission determines adequately addresses such threat.
- "(C) The date that is 1 year after the issuance of an order under paragraph (1).
- "(6) Cost recovery.—If the Commission determines that owners, operators, or users of the bulk-power system or of defense critical electric infrastructure have incurred substantial costs to comply with an order under this subsection and that such costs were prudently incurred and cannot reasonably be recovered through regulated rates or market prices for

- the electric energy or services sold by such owners, operators, or users, the Commission shall, after notice and an opportunity for comment, establish a mecha-
- 4 nism that permits such owners, operators, or users to
- 5 recover such costs.
- 6 "(c) Measures to Address Grid Security
 7 Vulnerabilities.—

8 "(1) Commission authority.—If the Commis-9 sion, in consultation with appropriate Federal agen-10 cies, identifies a grid security vulnerability that the 11 Commission determines has not adequately been ad-12 dressed through a reliability standard developed and 13 approved under section 215, the Commission shall, 14 after notice and opportunity for comment and after 15 consultation with the Secretary, other appropriate 16 Federal agencies, and appropriate governmental au-17 thorities in Canada and Mexico, promulgate a rule or 18 issue an order requiring implementation, by any 19 owner, operator, or user of the bulk-power system in 20 the United States, of measures to protect the bulk-21 power system against such vulnerability. Before pro-22 mulgating a rule or issuing an order under this para-23 graph, the Commission shall, to the extent practicable 24 in light of the urgency of the need for action to ad-25 dress the grid security vulnerability, request and con-

- sider recommendations from the Electric Reliability
 Organization regarding such rule or order. The Commission may establish an appropriate deadline for the submission of such recommendations.
 - CERTAIN EXISTING CYBERSECURITY VULNERABILITIES.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this section, the Commission shall, after notice and opportunity for comment and after consultation with the Secretary, other appropriate Federal agencies, and appropriate governmental authorities in Canada and Mexico, promulgate a rule or issue an order requiring the implementation, by any owner, user, or operator of the bulkpower system in the United States, of such measures as are necessary to protect the bulk-power system against the vulnerabilities identified in the June 21, 2007, communication to certain 'Electricity Sector Owners and Operators' from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, acting in its capacity as the Electricity Sector Information and Analusis Center.
 - "(3) RESCISSION.—The Commission shall approve a reliability standard developed under section 215 that addresses a grid security vulnerability that is the subject of a rule or order under paragraph (1)

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

or (2), unless the Commission determines that such reliability standard does not adequately protect against such vulnerability or otherwise does not satisfy the requirements of section 215. Upon such approval, the Commission shall rescind the rule promulgated or order issued under paragraph (1) or (2) addressing such vulnerability, effective upon the effective date of the newly approved reliability standard.

"(4) Geomagnetic storms.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this section, the Commission shall, after notice and an opportunity for comment and after consultation with the Secretary and other appropriate Federal agencies, issue an order directing the Electric Reliability Organization to submit to the Commission for approval under section 215, not later than 1 year after the issuance of such order, reliability standards adequate to protect the bulk-power system from any reasonably foreseeable geomagnetic storm event. The Commission's order shall specify the nature and magnitude of the reasonably foreseeable events against which such standards must protect. Such standards shall appropriately balance the risks to the bulk-power system associated with such events, including any regional variation in such risks, and the costs of mitigating such risks.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

"(5) Large transformer availability.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this section, the Commission shall, after notice and an opportunity for comment and after consultation with the Secretary and other appropriate Federal agencies, issue an order directing the Electric Reliability Organization to submit to the Commission for approval under section 215, not later than 1 year after the issuance of such order, reliability standards addressing availability of large transformers. Such standards shall require entities that own or operate large transformers to ensure, individually or jointly, adequate availability of large transformers to promptly restore the reliable operation of the bulk-power system in the event that any such transformer is destroyed or disabled as a result of a reasonably foreseeable physical or other attack or geomagnetic storm event. The Commission's order shall specify the nature and magnitude of the reasonably foreseeable attacks or events that shall provide the basis for such standards. Such standards shall— "(A) provide entities subject to the stand-

"(A) provide entities subject to the standards with the option of meeting such standards individually or jointly; and

1	"(B) appropriately balance the risks associ-						
2	ated with a reasonably foreseeable attack or						
3	event, including any regional variation in suc						
4	risks, and the costs of ensuring adequate avail						
5	ability of spare transformers.						
6	"(d) Critical Defense Facilities.—						
7	"(1) Designation.—Not later than 180 day						
8	after the date of enactment of this section, the Presi						
9	dent shall designate, in a written directive or deter						
10	mination provided to the Commission, facilities lo						
11	cated in the United States (including the territories						
12	that are—						
13	"(A) critical to the defense of the United						
14	States; and						
15	"(B) vulnerable to a disruption of the sup-						
16	ply of electric energy provided to such facility by						
17	an external provider.						
18	The number of facilities designated by such directive						
19	or determination shall not exceed 100. The President						
20	may periodically revise the list of designated facilities						
21	through a subsequent written directive or determina-						
22	tion provided to the Commission, provided that the						
23	total number of designated facilities at any time shal						
24	not exceed 100.						

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

"(2) Commission Authority.—If the Commission identifies a defense critical electric infrastructure vulnerability that the Commission, in consultation with owners and operators of any facility or facilities designated by the President pursuant to paragraph (1), determines has not adequately been addressed through measures undertaken by owners or operators of defense critical electric infrastructure, the Commission shall, after notice and an opportunity for comment and after consultation with the Secretary and other appropriate Federal agencies, promulgate a rule or issue an order requiring implementation, by any owner or operator of defense critical electric infrastructure, of measures to protect the defense critical electric infrastructure against such vulnerability. The Commission shall exempt from any such rule or order any specific defense critical electric infrastructure that the Commission determines already has been adequately protected against the identified vulnerability. The Commission shall make any such determination in consultation with the owner or operator of the facility designated by the President pursuant to paragraph (1) that relies upon such defense critical electric infrastructure.

1 "(3) Cost recovery.—An owner or operator of 2 defense critical electric infrastructure shall be re-3 quired to take measures under paragraph (2) only to 4 the extent that the owners or operators of a facility 5 or facilities designated by the President pursuant to 6 paragraph (1) that rely upon such infrastructure 7 agree to bear the full incremental costs of compliance 8 with a rule promulgated or order issued under para-9 graph (2). 10 "(e) Protection of Information.— 11 "(1) Prohibition of public disclosure of PROTECTED INFORMATION.—Protected information— 12 13 "(A) shall be exempt from disclosure under 14 section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code; 15 and "(B) shall not be made available pursuant 16 17 to any State, local, or tribal law requiring dis-18 closure of information or records. 19 "(2) Information sharing.— 20 "(A) In General.—Consistent with the 21 Controlled Unclassified Information framework 22 established by the President, the Commission 23 shall promulgate such regulations and issue such 24 orders as necessary to designate protected infor-

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

mation and to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of such protected information.

> "(B) Sharing of protected informa-TION.—The regulations promulgated and orders issued pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall provide standards for and facilitate the appropriate sharing of protected information with, between, and by Federal, State, local, and tribal authorities, the Electric Reliability Organization, regional entities, and owners, operators, and users of the bulk-power system in the United States and of defense critical electric infrastructure. In promulgating such regulations and issuing such orders, the Commission shall take account of the role of State commissions in reviewing the prudence and cost of investments within their respective jurisdictions. The Commission shall consult with appropriate Canadian and Mexican authorities to develop protocols for the sharing of protected information with, between, and by appropriate Canadian and Mexican authorities and owners, operators, and users of the bulkpower system outside the United States.

"(3) Submission of information to con-Gress.—Nothing in this section shall permit or au-

- thorize the withholding of information from Congress, 1 2 any committee or subcommittee thereof, or the Comptroller General. 3
- "(4) Disclosure of non-protected informa-5 TION.—In implementing this section, the Commission 6 shall protect from disclosure only the minimum 7 amount of information necessary to protect the reli-8 ability of the bulk-power system and of defense crit-9 ical electric infrastructure. The Commission shall seg-10 regate protected information within documents and electronic communications, wherever feasible, to facili-12 tate disclosure of information that is not designated 13 as protected information.
 - "(5) Duration of Designation.—Information may not be designated as protected information for longer than 5 years, unless specifically redesignated by the Commission.
 - "(6) Removal of Designation.—The Commission may remove the designation of protected information, in whole or in part, from a document or electronic communication if the unauthorized disclosure of such information could no longer be used to impair the reliability of the bulk-power system or of defense critical electric infrastructure.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

1 "(7) Judicial review of designations.—Not-2 withstanding subsection (f) of this section or section 313, a person or entity may seek judicial review of 3 a determination by the Commission concerning the designation of protected information under this sub-5 6 section exclusively in the district court of the United 7 States in the district in which the complainant re-8 sides, or has his principal place of business, or in the 9 District of Columbia. In such a case the court shall 10 determine the matter de novo, and may examine the 11 contents of documents or electronic communications 12 designated as protected information in camera to de-13 termine whether such documents or any part thereof 14 were improperly designated as protected information. 15 The burden is on the Commission to sustain its des-16 ignation. 17 "(f) Judicial Review.—The Commission shall act expeditiously to resolve all applications for rehearing of or-18 19 ders issued pursuant to this section that are filed under sec-20 tion 313(a). Any party seeking judicial review pursuant to 21 section 313 of an order issued under this section may obtain such review only in the United States Court of Appeals for

24 "(g) Provision of Assistance to Industry in 25 Meeting Grid Security Protection Needs.—

the District of Columbia Circuit.

"(1) Expertise and resources.—The Secretary shall establish a program, in consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies, to develop technical expertise in the protection of systems for the generation, transmission, and distribution of electric energy against geomagnetic storms or malicious acts using electronic communications or electromagnetic pulse that would pose a substantial risk of disruption to the operation of those electronic devices or communications networks, including hardware, software, and data, that are essential to the reliability of such systems. Such program shall include the identification and development of appropriate technical and electronic resources, including hardware, software, and system equipment.

"(2) Sharing expertise.—As appropriate, the Secretary shall offer to share technical expertise developed under the program under paragraph (1), through consultation and assistance, with owners, operators, or users of systems for the generation, transmission, or distribution of electric energy located in the United States and with State commissions. In offering such support, the Secretary shall assign higher priority to systems serving facilities designated by the President pursuant to subsection (d)(1) and other

- critical-infrastructure facilities, which the Secretary shall identify in consultation with the Commission and other appropriate Federal agencies.
- 4 "(3) Security clearances and communica-5 TION.—The Secretary shall facilitate and, to the ex-6 tent practicable, expedite the acquisition of adequate 7 security clearances by key personnel of any entity 8 subject to the requirements of this section to enable 9 optimum communication with Federal agencies re-10 garding gridsecurity threats. grid security 11 vulnerabilities, and defense critical electric infrastruc-12 ture vulnerabilities. The Secretary, the Commission, 13 and other appropriate Federal agencies shall, to the 14 extent practicable and consistent with their obliga-15 tions to protect classified and protected information, 16 share timely actionable information regarding grid 17 security threats, grid security vulnerabilities, and de-18 fense critical electric infrastructure vulnerabilities 19 with appropriate key personnel of owners, operators, 20 and users of the bulk-power system and of defense 21 critical electric infrastructure.".

(b) Conforming Amendments.—

(1) Jurisdiction.—Section 201(b)(2) of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824(b)(2)) is amended

22

23

- 1 by inserting "215A," after "215," each place it ap-
- 2 pears.
- 3 (2) Public utility.—Section 201(e) of the Fed-
- 4 eral Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824(e)) is amended by in-
- 5 serting "215A," after "215,".

Amend the title so as to read: "A bill to amend the Federal Power Act to protect the bulk-power system and electric infrastructure critical to the defense of the United States against cybersecurity and other threats and vulnerabilities.".

Union Calendar No. 281

111TH CONGRESS H. R. 5026

[Report No. 111-493]

A BILL

To amend the Federal Power Act to protect the bulk-power system and electric infrastructure critical to the defense of the United States from cybersecurity and other threats and vulnerabilities.

May 25, 2010

Reported with amendments, committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed